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GOOD CAUSE AND JUST EXPECTATIONS:
ACADEMIC TENURE IN OKLAHOMA'S
PUBLIC COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
HARRY F. TEPKER, JR.*

L Introduction
The significance and meaning of academic tenure in public colleges and univer-

sities is a source of constant litigation. Oklahoma law is not exempt from the
confusion caused by the idea that tenure is a guarantee of lifetime employment.

Additionally, the confusion in Oklahoma is perpetuated by the oft-quoted principle
that the state cannot enter into contracts that bind subsequent legislatures to spend

Oklahoma tax dollars.
In a recent case, the Attorney General of Oklahoma briefly submitted - and then

withdrew - an argument that a tenured professor who is unjustly discharged is
entitled to pay for'the remainder of an academic year, but no more.' This essay
attempts to survey the legal principles governing academic tenure, damages for

wrongful discharge and the meaning of Oklahoma's constitutional prohibition against
deficit spending and certain types of binding contracts.
Section II of this essay attempts to describe the nature and meaning of academic
tenure. Specifically, the essay addresses whether faculty who have earned tenure at
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* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. This article is drawn from research and argument
submitted in a brief filed on behalf of the American Association of University Professors, the Oklahoma
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thoughtful help of Ann H. Franke, Counsel, American Association of University Professors, who was
co-counsel on the brief. Also, the author would like to thank Denise R. Boklach for her research
assistance on both the brief and on this article. Finally, the author would like to thank his colleagues,
Michael Scaperlanda and Peter Graves, who reviewed and commented on the brief.
1. Appellant's Petition in Error at 10, Murray State College v. Brown, No. 78,293 (Okla. filed Sept..
18, 1991).
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Oklahoma's public colleges and universities enjoy tenure protection as customarily
defined by colleges and universities throughout the United States.

In section III, the problem of remedies is considered. One of the most frequently
misunderstood notions surrounding academic tenure is the idea that a professor
terminated in violation of tenure rights is entitled to full salary until retirement. The
idea seems logical to the layman because problems of proof, mitigation and the

alternative possibility of reinstatement are not considered. Still, it is appropriate to
consider whether ordinary contract damages are available. This means a court must

decide whether a faculty member who is dismissed in violation of tenure rights by
a public college or university in Oklahoma is entitled to a remedy that protects his

or her expectation interest in performance of the contract.
Finally, in section IV, the essay focuses on an alleged conflict between the
common law of contracts and the Oklahoma Constitution. This conflict presents the
issue of whether the contract rights of tenured faculty serving in Oklahoma's public
colleges and universities are abrogated, nullified or impaired because of the
balanced budget provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution.'
II. Academic Tenure in Higher Education
Academic tenure is a "status granted, usually after [a] probationary period, which

protects [a] teacher from dismissal except for serious misconduct, incompetence,
financial exigency, or change in institutional programs."' Though tenure is often

perceived as a commitment to employ a professor until death or retirement, the
commitment is not E,.bsolute in any sense. "Tenure ...

lays no claim whatever to

a guarantee of lifetime employment."' Instead, academic tenure is appropriately and
precisely defined as. "an arrangement under which faculty appointments in an

institution of higher education are continued until retirement.., subject to dismissal
for adequate cause. '
Colleges and universities make express offers and guarantees of tenure to attract
faculty of quality through promises of economic security and academic freedom. In

2. OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 23.
3. Price v. Oklahoma College of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery, 733 P.2d 1357, 1358 n.l (Okla.
Ct. App. 1986).
4. William Van Alslyne, Tenure: A Summary, Explanation and "Defense", 57 AAUP BULL. 328,
328 (1971).
5.

COMM'N ON ACADEMIC TENURE IN HIGHER EDUCATION, FACULTY TENURE: A REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS 256 (1973); see aLro, e.g., King v. University of Minn., 774 F.2d 224,227 (8th Cir.
1985) (removal of tenured professor for cause), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1095 (1986); Levin v. Harleston,
770 F. Supp. 895, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd in part,vacated in part, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); Van
Alstyne, supra note 4, at 328 ("Tenure provides only that no person continuously retained as a full-time
faculty member beyond a specified lengthy period of probationary service may thereafter be dismissed
without adequate cause."); Robert C. Ludolph, Termination Of Faculty Tenure Rights Due To Financial
Exigency and ProgramDiscontinuance,63 U. DET. L. REv. 609, 617 (1986) ("The 'for cause' grounds
for dismissal of tenured faculty are generally of three types - immorality, incompetence, and
insubordination."); Joe L. Heaton, Comment, Administrative Law: Dismissal of Tenured Faculty in
Oklahoma Colleges and Universities, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 370 (1976); CLARK BYSE & LOUIS JOUGHIN,
TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: PLANS, PRACTICES AND THE LAW
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its historic Statement of Principleson Academic Freedomand Tenure, the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) described the purpose of tenure:
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) freedom of teaching
and research and of extramural activities, and (2) a sufficient degree of
economic security to make the profession attractive to men and women
of ability. Freedom and economic security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to the success of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to its
students and to society."
The security of academic positions has been the subject of debate throughout
American history. In oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in the historic
case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,7 Daniel Webster described "the estates
and freeholds of a most deserving class ... of scholars who have consented to
forego the advantages of professional and public employments, and to devote
themselves to science and literature, and the instruction of youth, in the quiet
retreats of academic life."' Webster contended the faculty of the college possessed
"sacred" property rights which were imperiled when New Hampshire sought to seize
the college.
Whether, to dispossess and oust them; to deprive them of their office,
and turn them out of their livings; to do this, not by the power of their
legal visitors, or governors, but by acts of the legislature; and to do it
without forfeiture, and without fault; whether all this be not in the
highest degree an indefensible and arbitrary proceeding, is a question,
of which there would seem to be but one side fit for a lawyer or a
scholar to espouse
Webster's remarks foreshadowed the defense of tenure as a useful way to promote
the special purposes of academic communities. As the AAUP wrote in 1915,
The ...conception of a university as an ordinary business venture,
and of academic teaching as a purely private employment, manifests
also a radical failure to apprehend the nature of the social function
discharged by the professional scholar .... [I]t is to the public interest
that the professorial office should be one both of dignity and of
independence.
If education is the corner stone of the structure of society and if
progress in scientific knowledge is essential to civilization, few things
can be more important than to enhance the dignity of the scholar's
profession, with a view to attracting into its ranks men of the highest
ability, of sound learning, and of strong and independent character.'"
6. 1940 Statement of Principles an Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in AAUP POLICY
DOCUMENTS & REPORTS at 3 (1990) [hereinafter AAUP Statement].
7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
8. Id.at 584 (argument).
9. Id.
10. COMM. ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM &TENURE, AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, GENERAL
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once described by Justice Benjamin

[t]he governing body of a university makes no attempt to control its
professors and instructors as if they were its servants. By practice and
tradition, the members of the faculty are masters, and not servants, in
the conduct of the class room. They have the independence appropriate
to a company of scholars."
Tenure also became a principal method of insulating the individual professor from
governmental and societal pressures. "Through the influence of the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP), academic tenure gradually gained
acceptance as a means of protecting the right to pursue research and to state convictions without fear of reprisal from a hostile university administration or
public."'2 In short, tenure is "a long-term academic and financial commitment by
a university to an individual" that allows an economic security and freedom of
expression that permits "the university [to] carry out a basic function - the
vigorous exchange of ideas - a function that itself enjoys constitutional protec'3
tion. '
The distinctive mission of American higher education may help to explain why
institutions grant tenure; but the enforceability of tenure rests also on contract
principles applicable to a wide variety of employment relationships. Academic
tenure is the product of a bargain between academic institutions and faculty to
create a relationship that is an exception to the general rule that indefinite
employments are terminable at will. In contrast to ordinary "at-will" employments,
a "written contract with an explicit tenure provision clearly is evidence of a formal
understanding that supports a teacher's claim
of entitlement to continued employ4
ment unless sufficient 'cause' is shown."'1
For many decades, institutions denied tenure protection to men and women who
dedicated themselves to academic pursuits. Until the twentieth century, professors
in both public and private institutions often served at the will of the president and

REPORT (1915), reprinted in 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 393, 396 (1990).

1i. Hamburger v. Correll Univ., 148 N.E. 539, 541 (N.Y. 1925); cf NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444
U.S. 672, 673 (1980) (holding that full-time faculty members exercising extensive control over academic
and personnel decisions and over the central policies of the university come within "judicially implied
exclusion for 'managerial employees'" not protected by Taft-Hartley Act).
12. Ludolph, supra note 5, at 613.
13. Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870, 875 (1st Cir. 1981); see also, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne,
Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried
HistoricalReview, 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1990).
14. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); see aLto, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,
344-47 (1976) (stating that a person who holds a job from which he can be removed "at will" does not
have a protected property interest); Beitzell, 643 F.2d at 874-75 (holding that "ln the area of
government employment, a person who holds a job from which he can be removed only 'for cause', has
a protected property interest, while one who can be removed 'at
will' does not); Olivier v. Xavier Univ.,
553 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (Plotkin, J., concurring), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 1279 (La.
1990); Thorne v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 542 So. 2d 490 (La. 1989).
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the governing board."5 Though academicians argued that their responsibilities were
different and more socially important than other work, their arguments began to
persuade courts only after the law began to recognize employment agreements that
included explicit promises of job security. As public employees, labor union
members and, later, other woikers in the private sector challenged the rule that
indefinite employments were terminable at will, academicians were more able to
defend tenure rights. As described by Professor Matthew Finkin, "most of what may
have appeared exceptional at the time of the [AAUP's] 1940 Statement is no longer
exceptional today, as employer policies and employment law have extended to
employees in other fields much of the job protection and workplace liberty the 1940
Statement accorded to professors."'" Indeed, the concept of academic tenure
probably anticipated and encouraged similar legal security for workplace liberty for
many other workers in many other types of employment relationships. 7
Tenured professors enjoy a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Oklahoma recognizes tenure rights as customarily
defined by colleges and universities throughout the United States.
Oklahonia is one of many states which has declined to overturn the traditional atwill rule by "judicial fiat," but which also protects "the benefits which employees can
and should get only through collective bargaining agreements or tenure provisions. '
Academic tenure in Oklahoma's public colleges and universities has both a
statutory and contractual basis. Oklahoma law authorizes the Oklahoma State Regents
for Higher Education to "establish and maintain plans for tenure . . . with funds
available for payment of its operating expenses.''" The Oklahoma legislature
decided not to define tenure rights by statute; rather, it chose to vest the Regents with
authority to define tenure rights as part of the Regents' overall authority for public
institutions of higher education.' This practice is not unusual. Many states entrust
independent boards to handle questions of tenure to protect public colleges and
universities from undue political pressure. As a result, tenure in a public institution
becomes a vested right authorized when the institution acts based on the constitutional or statutory authority vested in a governing board.
15. See, e.g., Ludolph, supra note 5; Arthur 0. Lovejoy, Academic Freedom and Tenure: Rollins
College Report, 19 AAUP BuLL. 416, 422 (1933), quoted in Matthew W. Finkin, "A Higher Order of
Liberty in the Workplace": Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Vortex of Employment Practices and
Law, LAW & CONTEMp. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 357, 357 (vol. 53, no. 3).
16. Finkin, supra note 15, at 358.
17. Id. at 360, 366.
18. See Cleveland Bd. of Edu . v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Short v. Kiamichi Area
Vocational-Technical Sch. Dist., 761 P.2d 472, 475 (Okla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989).
19. See Price v. Oklahoma College of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery, 733 P.2d 1357, 1358 n.1
(Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that academic tenure is a "status granted, usually after probationary
period, which protects a teacher from dismissal except for serious misconduct, incompetence, financial
exigency, or change in institutional programs.").
20. Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 554 n.18 (Okla. 1987) (quoting Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985)).
21. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 3205(a) (1991).
22. King v. Board of Regents, 541 P.2d 836, 837 (Okla. 1975).
23. See, e.g., Stebbins v. Weaver, 396 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Wis. 1975), affd, 537 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.
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As is sometimes true in commercial, business, or other public employment
contexts, ' an academic institution's rules and policies may establish the existence
or meaning of an employment contract.' In the academic setting, a professor's

contractual rights are often articulated in faculty handbooks because, in part, the basic
terms and conditions of employment cannot be spelled out in the letter or notice of

appointment.' This approach is especially important for "contracts in and among
a community of scholars, which is what a university is.""7

When public colleges and universities dismiss faculty members in violation of their
contract rights, the victims suffer a deprivation of property interests in violation of
due process principle;.' Oklahoma law establishes tenure policies and procedures,
which include removal criteria and procedural guidelines for dismissal of faculty. 9
In such cases, tenured faculty have more than an abstract need, desire or unilateral
expectation in continued employment. They have a property interest in their position
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 " Prior to
termination, tenured faculty must'be given notice and an opportunity to be heard."
III. Expectation Interests and Tenure
When a university violates its own rules and regulations and dismisses a faculty
member without just cause and without a hearing, the victim deserves the same
remedies that are generally available for other workers in the private and public

sector who made similar bargains for job security.

1976), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977);.Sheppard v. West Va. Bd. of Regents, 378 F. Supp. 4 (D. W.
Va. 1974), aft'd, 516 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1975); State ex reL Bourgeois v. Board of Supervisors, 17 So.
2d 25 (La. 1944); Papadopoulos v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 511 P.2d 854 (Or. Ct. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974); Cathcart v. Anderson, 517 P.2d 980 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), aJf'd, 530
P.2d 313 (Wash. 1975).
24. See, e.g., Blanton v. Housing Auth., 794 P.2d 412, 414-15 (Okla. 1990) (holding that absent
evidence of a substantive restriction on the authority's power to dismiss employee or a statute conferring
a property right in continued employment, employment contract was terminable at will) (citing Asbill
v. Housing Auth., 726 F.2d 1499, 1502 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating that if a policy restricts the reasons for
discharge of an employee to just cause shown, then the employee has a right to employment until such
cause is shown)); Hinson, 742 P.2d at 554-57 (holding that "employer handbooks and policy manuals"
are among the "[flactors which have been isolated as critical to evaluate whether an implied contract right
to job security exists"); id. at 560 (Kauger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
"[e]mployers may be accountable for the promises they make, and the policies they adopt, when those
promises and policies induce employee reliance or form part of a contract.").
25. See, e.g., Miller v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 56, 609 P.2d 756,759 (Okla. 1980) (deciding that
the board's policy statement was incorporated by implication in a teacher's contract of employment).
26. Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that faculty employment contracts "comprehend as essential parts [a university's] employment regulations and customs").
27. Id.; see also Finkir,, supra note 15, at 361.
28. Short v, Kiamichi Area Vocational-Technical Sch. Dist., 761 P.2d 472, 475-76 (Okla. 1988),
cert. denied,489 U.S. 1066 (1989).
29. See id. at 482.
30. Id. at 476 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)).
31. Id. at 478; see also Maupin v. Independent Sch. Dist., 632 P.2d 396, 397-99 (Okla. 198 1); Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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There is little reason to depart from the established principles governing contract
remedies. If a tenured professor at a public university is wrongfully dismissed, he
or she should be "put in as good a position as he [or she] would have been in had
the contract been performed."3
Ordinarily, a promisee may recover damages for loss of anticipated profits, if
such profits were contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was formed,
if the loss was the proximate result of the promisor's breach of contract, and if the
loss is capable of reasonably accurate measurement.33 In other words, "[t]he law
of damages permits recovery of lost profits to protect the injured promisee's
'expectation interest,' his prospect of net gain from the contract.""
Bruno v. DetroitInstitute of Technolog3 5 is one of the few cases that discusses
the problem of damages in an academic tenure case. In Bruno, the Michigan Court
of Appeals held that a professor who had been wrongly discharged was entitled to
future damages because the institute's policy defined tenure as an "expectation of
continuous appointment until retirement, with stipulations that it may be terminated
for causes specifically identified in the present statement of tenure policy."36 The
court continued: "The proper measure of damages[] is 'to "put the injured party in
as good a position as he would have had if performance had been rendered as
promised.' 37 The court admitted that calculating damages would be difficult, but
difficulty alone was not sufficient to bar recovery.3 1 "There will be a great many
problems in attempting to ascertain what the anticipated salaries and earnings will
be; however, . . . 'It is the uncertainty as to the fact of legal damages that is fatal
to recovery, but not uncertainty as to the amount."'39 Moreover, as the court noted,
"the entire problem of future damages could be avoided if defendant were now
willing to abide by its contractual obligation and again allow plaintiff to return to
his teaching post. '
Legal protection of a contracting party's "expectation interest" does not require
monetary windfall. In fact, courts should be reluctant to "consider remedies
beyond compensation for the employee's reliance and expectation interests, "' and

32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981).
33. See Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. Merchant, 380 P.2d 682, 684-86 (Okla. 1962); Ash v. Chas.
F. Noble Oil & Gas Co., 223 P. 175, 178 (Okla. 1923); Cloe v. Rogers, 121 P. 201 (Okla. 1912).
34. Osborn v. Comanche Cattle Indus., 545 P.2d 827, 831 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975); see aLro Lindsey
v. University of Ariz., 754 P.2d 1152, 1157-58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding damages award to fully
compensate for expectations of three years' continuing employment, though employee's written contract
was for a one-year term and dismissal did not violate the explicit contract terms); cf. Linn v. Andover
Newton Theological Sch., Inc., 874 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that in age discrimination case,
tenured professor entitled to "frontpay" damages equal to the salary to be earned until age 70).
35. 215 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
36. Id. at 749.
37. Id. (quoting Dierickx v. Vulcan Indus., 158 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (quoting
in turn 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 992, at 5 (1951))).
38. Bruno, 215 N.W.2d at 749-50.
39. Id. (quoting Barry v. Flint Fire Dep't, 205 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)).
40. Id. at 750.
41. Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 561 (Okla. 1987) (Kauger, J., concurring in part and dis-
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only in cases in which "the employee proves that the employer acted for legally
intolerable motives,"'4: should the court consider such remedy. The victim of a
contract breach has no right to more than performance would have provided.
This [expectation] interest is given legal protection to achieve the
paramount objective of putting the promisee injured by the breach in the
position in which he would have been had the contract been performed.
But the protection of the promisee's expectation interest extends no
further; he may not recover more than the amount he might have gained
by full performance.43
For this reason, a "court may limit damages for foreseeable loss ... if it concludes
that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate
compensation.""
Also, if a prevailing plaintiff fails to show the amount of damages flowing from
the contract breach or if the amount of damages is otherwise uncertain, a court is
well within established principles of justice if it limits recovery. "Damages are not
recoverable for loss beyond45' an amount that the evidence permits to be established
with reasonable certainty.
In many cases, recovery of damages from the time of termination until anticipated
retirement may prove, on closer scrutiny, to be unsuitable.' First, it may not be
clear whether reinstatement is an alternative to monetary relief for salary until after
trial. Second, a reinstatement order might be properly subject to the rights of the
college to pursue appropriate procedures to resolve whether a professor might truly
deserve termination - after appropriate hearings. Specifically a tenured professor
can recover only those monetary damages flowing from the breach, which may be
minimal if the college's failure is only a failure to follow its own procedures,
including a failure to hold a hearing. The possibility would exist in such cases that
a professor might have been terminated anyway.
With all factors in mind, a trial court must consider whether compensation for
expected earnings under the contract is appropriate relief. In Bruno, the court
offered the trial court guidance for computing damages. First, damages to
compensate for the years after the filing of the complaint "must be reduced to their
present worth."' The appellate court provided instructions on "the proper method
for computing ... future damages.""

senting in part).
42. Id.
43. Osborn v. Comancha Cattle Indus., 545 P.2d 827, 831 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (citations omitted).
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(3) (1981).
45. Id. § 352.
46. Federal law will abolish mandatory retirement for tenured faculty on December 31, 1993. Age
Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 6(b), 100 Stat. 3342, 3344,
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984)).
47. Bruno, 215 N.W.2d at 749 n.1.
48. Id. at 749.
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Based on evidence of the college's past experience, the trial court should project
the anticipated level of compensation for similarly situated professors for each of
the years until the date when plaintiff probably would have retired' Next, a trial
court should project plaintiffs anticipated earnings based on the assumption that
plaintiff would make good faith efforts to mitigate damages by securing another job
in his chosen profession." Third, for each year, the court should subtract
anticipated earnings of plaintiff in mitigation from the anticipated salary he would
have received at the defendant institution.5 Next, for each year, the court should
reduce the difference to its worth as of the date of the filing of the complaint.52
Finally, the trial court should award plaintiff the sum of these properly mitigated
and reduced figures. 3
Reinstatement and back pay may be a more appropriate remedy.' In most cases,
damages awards to compensate for future earnings under a contract - or "front
pay" - are only necessary because reinstatement is not appropriate either because
it is unacceptable to both the employer and employee or because it is impractical
for job-related reasons.5"
In King v. Board of Regents," the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered the
rights of four terminated professors who were tenured at the time of their dismissal.
The college's tenure policy stated that tenured instructors were permanent members
of the college faculty and could only be dismissed for cause. The policy manual
required written notice, a hearing and an opportunity for appeal prior to termination.
The instructors in King were given no notice of the cause for their dismissal and no
hearing was granted. The college offered to reinstate the four instructors. The court
held that reinstatement was sufficient to support a finding that tenure rights had not
been violated.' In short, reinstatement is an equitable remedy that fully vindicates
the expectation interest.
IV. Tenure, Balanced Budgets and the Constitution of Oklahoma
Tenure rights need not - and must not - be nullified in order to preserve the
state's ability to respond to actual fiscal crisis. The balanced budget provision of the
Oklahoma Constitution"0 must be given a meaning that allows the provision to

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

54. See, e.g., Redman v. Department of Educ., 519 P.2d 760, 769-70 (Alaska 1974) (holding that
reinstatement ends monetary liability); Board of Trustees v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009, 1014-16 (Wyo. 1978)
(affirming award of reinstatement and back pay).
55. See, e.g., White Man v. Gunnick, 473 N.W.2d 148, 151 (S.D. 1991) (remanding case to determine whether reinstatement is a viable alternative).
56. 541 P.2d 836 (Okla. 1975).

57. Id.at 840.
58. The relevant provision provides: "The state shall never create or authorize the creation of any
debt or obligation, or fund or pay any deficit, against the state, or any department, institution or agency
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satisfy its purpose. However, it must not be distorted to impair or void the
expectations of public servants dedicated to higher education in Oklahoma.
The object of article 10, section 23 of the Oklahoma Statutes is to preserve the
legislature's capacity to ensure that the state lives within its means. The constitutional provision is aso designed "to prevent one legislative assembly from laying
its mandate upon a -future one." 9 "Article 10, § 23 was adopted by the people in
1941 to provide for budget balancing in this state .... The fiscal responsibility
shown by Oklahoma has become an enviable example for the nation. This policy
of fiscal restraint and control can only be applauded in a time of monetary crisis.' '"
In PrudentialProperty and Casualty Company v. Grimes," the Oklahoma Supreme
Court reaffirmed the meaning and purpose of the balanced budget provisions of the
Oklahoma Constitution:
[T]he debt limitation provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution are a vital
part of the document and were adopted for the purpose of fixing the
power and responsibility of legislation relating to the fiscal affairs of the
state upon the existing legislative assembly,' and to prevent one
legislative assembly from laying its mandate upon a future legislature.
Thus, debt limitation guarantees the autonomy of future legislative
bodies and protects Oklahoma citizens from deficit spending beyond the
revenues available.'
The tenure rights of college and university faculty do not truly "bind the revenues
of a succeeding fiscal year."' State and local governments could not function
"except under severe handicap" if all contracts to pay money in the future were
barred by constitutional prohibitions relating to governmental indebtedness.' As
a result, courts do not impose straitjackets on public authorities by automatically
nullifying "contracts payable by a government in installments in the future when the
consideration which the payor is to receive in return for such payments is also to
be provided in the future."'5
Apart from the balanced budget guarantee, tenure rights do not impair the ability
of public authorities to make reasonable judgments based upon fiscal need.
Financial exigency can be a valid cause for dismissal of tenured faculty.' In
Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

thereof, regardless of its form or the source of money from which it is to be paid ... OKLA. CONsT.

art. 10, § 23.
59. Boswell v. State, 74 P.2d 940, 947 (Okla. 1937).
60. Smith v. State Be. of Equalization, 630 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Okla. 1981).
61. 725 P.2d 1246 (Okla. 1986).
62. Id. at 1251-52.
63. Consolidated Sch. Dist. v. Panther Oil & Grease Mfg. Co., 168 P.2d 613, 614 (Okla. 1946)
(quoting Smith v. School Dist. No. i, 102 P.2d 131, 135 (Okla. 1940)).
64. In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Auth., 355 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Okla,1960) (quoting State
ex reL Thomson v. Giessel, 65 N.W.2d 529, 536 (Wis. 1954)).
65. Id. (quoting Gie.ssei, 65 N.W.2d at 536).
66. See AAUP Stateent supra note 6, at 4.
67. 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978).
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Circuit accepted the AAUP's Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure as part of the academic common law. The court concluded that the national
academic community understands the concept of tenure to embrace financial
exigency as a basis for breaking a tenure contract.'
In another case, Jimenez v. Almodovar, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit concluded that due process principles did not bar a university's
decision to discontinue a program for fiscal reasons:
American courts and secondary authorities uniformly recognize that,
unless otherwise provided in the agreement of the parties, or in the
regulations of the institution, or in a statute, an institution of higher
education has an implied contractual right to make in good faith an
unavoidable termination of right to the employment of a tenured
member of the faculty when his position is being eliminated as part of
a change in academic program."
Moreover, "[t]he scope of judicial review of the decision to declare exigency is
narrow. Determinations by public governing boards are reviewed as agency
decisions which are presumed to be correct. . . . These decisions will not be
overturned unless the individual can show arbitrary action or discriminatory
motivation.""'
There is nothing unusual about a contract for professional services and
compensation limited to a specific period of time which also includes duties,
promises or covenants that survive for a longer period. For example, a collective
bargaining agreement may be "effective" for a specified time, but the duty to
arbitrate and other duties may survive for longer periods of time." Finally,
employees may make enforceable covenants that survive a contractual term. An
obvious example is an employee's covenant not to compete with an employer for
a period of time after an employment relationship has terminated.

68. Krotkoff, 585 F.2d at 678.
69. 650 F.2d 363 (Ist Cir. 1981).
70. Id. at 368.
7 1. Ludolph, supra note 5, at 652; see also, e.g., Brenna v. Southern Colo. State College, 589 F.2d
475, 476 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding that termination of a tenured faculty member rather than untenured
faculty was made in good faith and was not a pretext for unlawful motives); Bignall v. North Idaho College, 538 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1976); Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d 843, 847 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (holding that in the interest of administrative flexibility, "for cause" dismissal procedures were not
required for terminations due to financial exigency or program discontinuance); Scheuer v. Creighton
Univ., 260 N.W.2d 595, 600 (Neb. 1977) (holding that a university may eliminate faculty within school
of pharmacy to alleviate a university-wide fiscal crisis); Klein v. Board of Higher Educ., 434 F. Supp.
1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (upholding mass termination of tenured faculty in response to New York City's
financial emergency); Graney v. Board of Regents, 286 N.W.2d 138, 146 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (holding
that dismissal based on financial exigency does not violate tenure rights).
72. See, e.g., Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 430 U.S. 243, 249
(1977) (upholding arbitration order because "[t]he dispute... although arising after the expiration of the
...contract, clearly arises under that contract"); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960) (stating that courts should not overrule arbitrator's decision that employer's duty
survived expiration of collective bargaining agreement).
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The relationship between tenured faculty and an institution is a contractual
arrangement. It may consist of separate appointments for one-year periods or other
specified terms. It may also include institutional covenants or promises to renew or
reappoint for a longer - perhaps indefinite - period." Viewed in this manner,
the annual appointment for a specified salary is only one aspect of an employment
contract that encompasses many other elements. The United States Supreme Court
recognized that an employment relationship may include an employer's duty to give
fair consideration to an employee for promotion or even partnership. 4 Similarly,
an academic employer's duties include fair, nondiscriminatory treatment of faculty
for tenure. One remedy for a violation of the duty may be an order reinstating a
faculty member and granting tenure."
In University of Arizona v. County of Pima,76 the university hired a basketball
coach with the assurance that his contract would be resubmitted annually for
reappointment for a minimum of four years, even though the university made
faculty and other appointments only for one-year terms. One year after the coach
was hired, the athletic director notified him that his contract would not be submitted
for renewal. The university sought to avoid liability by arguing that it could not
make an enforceable contract for more than one year because of a state statute
prohibiting any obligation not authorized by appropriation.
Though tenure was not involved in the Arizona case, the court reviewed the
tenure provisions of the university's policy manual.' The policy manual specifically mentioned that appointments or reappointments would be for a period not longer
than one fiscal year. However, the policy manual referred to tenure, which promised
reappointment until death, retirement, or resignation, unless a faculty member was
terminated for just cause, including budgetary reasons or misconduct. Read together,
the seemingly contradictory provisions of the policy manual obliged the university
to resubmit a tenured faculty member's appointment year after year until resignation
or retirement. To give effect to the Arizona statute, the court of appeals emphasized
that the n"final word is spoken by the legislature" because the faculty member can
be released for budgetary reasons." The law established a "fiscal out" which

73. A faculty member':; service is sufficient consideration for enforceable contract promises by a
university that extend beyord the one-year term. The fact that the promises of the college or university
may prove to be unenforceable or voidable because of possible fiscal need "does not prevent [them] from
being consideration." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 78 (1981). "There is no additional
requirement of... (b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or (c) 'mutuality of obligation.'' Id. § 79;

see also id. §§ 71, 80.
74. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,75 (1984) (being considered for partnership was term
or condition or benefit "that is part and parcel of employment relationship... [and] may not be doled
out in a discriminatory fashion").

75. Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 360 (lst Cir. 1989) (holding that order of
tenure is appropriate equitable remedy for violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 937 (1990).
76. 722 P.2d 352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
77. Id. at 355.
78. Id.
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operated as a condition subsequent, allowing the university to avoid its obligations
if the requisite funding was not forthcoming. 9
However, the Arizona Court of Appeals respected and enforced the university's
promises of job security to the coach.' The court found that, subject to a condition
subsequent of available funding, contracts for more than one year were valid and
did not violate the statutory prohibition against financial obligations for which there
is no appropriation." Because the University of Arizona had maintained its
basketball program after the coach's departure, the court found that funding for the
coach's position must have been approved by the legislature.' On that basis, the
court approved an award of damages beyond the one-year contract term and
including the entire four years originally promised by the university. 3
V. Conclusion
Tenure is a controversial practice. Nothing in this essay directly addresses
whether tenure is an effective measure to secure better faculty and academic
freedom. Instead, the focus of this essay is that if tenure is to be abolished, the
decision must be made after a genuine and candid reevaluation of real arguments
for and against job security for academics.
Cases in which tenure rights are measured against state constitutional guarantees
of a balanced budget are poor vehicles for rethinking tenure in Oklahoma. In short,
state colleges and universities must not destroy existing expectations by means of
a back-door analysis of state constitutional provisions that have little or nothing to
do with tenure customs.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 356.
81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id.
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